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Abstract 
The most prominent exception to the cardinal 'most favoured nation' 
principle of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 is in 
its Article XXIV relating to Customs·Unions (CU's) and Free Trade Areas 
(FTA's). This article required, first, the general incidence of the duties 
and regulations of commerce imposed by members of the CU with respect to trade 
with non-members shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than 
those that were applicable prior to the formation of CU or FTA, and, second, 
that substantially all the trade among members be free. Neither requirement 
was very operational, with the phrases 'general incidence' and 'substantially 
all' being difficult legal concepts to apply. The agreement of 1994 
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) has made "general incidence" 
precise by defining it import-weighted average of height of barriers but 
without offering any rationale for the definition. Now that preferential 
trading arrangements such as FTA's are proliferating, reform of Article XXIV 
is of importance. This paper describes alternative approaches to the central 
question of common external tariffs of a CU. Taking off from the work of Kemp 
and Wan who showed the existence of a common external tariff of CU that keeps 
the welfare of non-members unchanged while revising that of the CU as compared 
to the situation prior to the formation of CU, it characterizes such a tariff 
structure for two leading benchmark examples as consumption-weighted average 
of pre-union tariffs and subsidies in the member countries. 
KEY WORDS: Customs Union, Free Trade Area, Common External Tariff, GATT, WTO 
1. Introduction 
The most favoured nation principle (or MFN principle as it is usually 
called) is enshrined in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) concluded in 1947 and is considered by all to be the foundation 
of the agreement. 1 Yet GATT has allowed several exceptions to MFN principle 
such as, for example, its "grandfathering" of pre-existing preferential trade 
arrangements, the notorious regime of discriminatory quantitative restrictions 
on trade in textiles called the multi-fibre arrangement, and the waiver 
granted to developing countries under the "enabling clause" of the Tokyo Round 
Agreement of 1979 for providing preferential access to other developing 
countries to their markets. However, the most prominent exception is in its 
Article XXIV relating to the Customs Unions (CU's) and Free Trade Areas 
(FTA's), since by their very definition both clearly involve preferential 
treatment of the trade among members of such arrangements as compared to their 
trade with non-members. Two essential features of the article as it relates 
to a Customs Union are: 
" (i) ... with respect to a customs union, or an 
interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs 
union, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution of any such union or 
interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting 
parties not parties to such union or agreement shall 
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than 
the .general incidence of the duties and regulations of 
commerce applicable in the constituent territories 
prior to the formation of such union or the adoption 
of such interim agreement' 
(ii) duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at 
least with respect to substantially all the trade in 
1Ironically, from a strictly economic perspective there is nothing to 
recommend non-discrimination among trade partners, as Harry Johnson (1976) 
pointed out long ago! 
2 
products originating in such territories [GATTII 
(1994), pp. 523-524, emphasis added] 
The article made it clear that any contracting party of the GATT deciding to 
enter into a CU or FTA or an interim agreement towards that end shall promptly 
notify the other contracting parties of their intentions to do so and, 
presumably, to agree to abide by the requirements of the article XXIV. 
It has been suggested that by insisting that the departure from MFN be 
extreme with respect to trade among members in that substantially all of it 
had to be free and also requiring that the general incidence of barriers on 
trade with non-members is not raised, the intention of the drafters of GATT 
was to make it very difficult to form a CU or FTA. Yet the history of 
consideration of notifications of such arrangements and actions on them by the 
contracting parties is one of evasion, rather than strict enforcement, of the 
provisions of Article XXIV. For example, in the case of the most celebrated 
such agreement, namely the Rome Treaty of the European Economic Community, the 
GATT 'blinked', according to Finger (1993, p. 137). He quotes from a report 
of a GATT (1959, p. 70) committee that considered the issue: 
"[T]he Committee felt that it would be more fruitful 
if attention could be directed to specific and 
practical problems, leaving aside for the time being 
questions of law and debates about the compatibility 
of the Rome Treaty with Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement." 
It is clear that even if the contracting parties wished to enforce 
Article XXIV they would have run into difficulties. As Jackson (1989, p. 141) 
points out, the requirements that substantially all trade among members be 
free -and the common external tariff 
"be not "on the whole" more restrictive than the 
"general incidence of" duties and regulations before 
the CU was formed ... however, [are] difficult legal 
concepts to apply, and have caused much controversy in 
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the GATT. In addition, the GATT exception allows an 
"interim agreement"--one which leads to a CU or FTA 
within a reasonable time--to depart from MFN. This 
has opened a loophole of considerable size, since 
almost any type of preferential agreement can be 
claimed to fall within the exception for "interim 
agreement," and "reasonable time" is exceedingly 
imprecise." 
The agreement concluding the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations signed in April 1994 at Marrakesh included an understanding with 
respect to the interpretation of Article XXIV. It clarified that for purposes 
of comparison, 
" the general incidence of the duties and other 
regulations of commerce applicable before and after 
the formation of a customs union shall in respect of 
duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment 
of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties 
collected. This assessment shall be based on import 
statistics for a previous representative period to be 
supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis 
and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO 
country of origin. For this purpose, the duties and 
charges to be taken into consideration shall be the 
applied rates of duty." 
The substitution of the vague phrase "general incidence" by a much more 
precise criterion for comparison of pre- and post-union tariff structures is 
to be welcomed. However no rationale for proposed criterion is offered. Nor 
is it established that one can infer how the interests of non-members are 
affected by the formation of CU by using the suggested comparison. 
The reform of Article XXIV began to attract scholarly attention largely 
because of a revived interest since the late eighties in free trade areas and 
other preferential trading arrangements (PTA's). 2 Between the initiation of 
2Among recent contributors to the literature related to Article XXIV are 
Bhagwati (1991, 1993), Bond et al. (1995), Finger (1993), Ju and Krishna 
(1996), McMillan (1993), Roessler (1993), Snape (1993), Syropoulos (1995a, 
1995b) and Winters (1996). 
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the Uruguay Round in 1986 and the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995 as many as 30 agreements were notified 
as compared to 68 agreements notified in the previous four decades (WTO 
(1995a), Appendix Table I,A). · The belief that such a revival was a passing 
phenomenon reflecting primarily a gloomy assessment (at the time of its mid­
term review in December 1988) of the prospect of successfully concluding the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, and the fear that the global trading system will 
break up into warring trade blocs, turned out to be mistaken. The interest in 
PTA's gathered further steam, rather than wane, even after the successful 
conclusion of the UR negotiations. In fact, since the establishment of WTO, 
12 more agreements have been notified (WTO (1995b), p. 12). As such, the 
reform of Article XXIV continues to be a matter of concern. Among the issues 
currently being raised is the central question of the common external tariffs 
of a customs union. What should be the structure of such tariffs? 
In what follows, I first briefly describe alternative approaches to this 
central question, in particular, whether the relevant issue should be one of 
the height of the post-union barriers on trade with non-members or one of 
post-union welfare of non-members (Section 2). Kemp and Wan (1976) in their 
celebrated article take the latter approach and showed the existence of a 
post-union tariff structure for a customs union (of any arbitrary collection 
of members of a global trading system) that is global welfare improving, as 
long as lump sum income transfers among members of the union are feasible. 3 
Such a tariff structure, in comparison to the pre-union world equilibrium, 
maintains the welfare of each resident of non-union members while increasing 
3For comparing alternative trading equilibria from a global welfare 
perspective, Pareto ranking is used. 
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the welfare of at least one resident of a member of the union. The Kemp-Wan 
proposition is of importance in that it shows the existence of a dynamic path 
to global free trade through successive enlargements of customs unions, each 
enlargement being Pareto-improving over its predecessor. Along such a path, 
the regional approach towards trade liberalization through the formation of 
customs unions becomes a "building-block" rather than a "stumbling block," to 
use Bhagwati's (1991) apt phrases, in the march towards global free trade. 
go beyond the Kemp-Wan proof of the existence of such a common tariff 
structure by characterizing it for two benchmark examples in terms of an 
appropriately defined average of different pre-union tariffs of members. Such 
an average is not only as well-defined as the average specified in the Uruguay 
Round version of Article XXIV, but unlike the latter it has a welfare content 
in addition. I show this using a Ricardian model of a three-country trading 
world in Section 3. In Section 4, I show analogous results hold in a model 
with a more complex production technology as long as all countries all 
countries have identical Samuelson social utility functions of the Cobb 
Douglas type. I also address the issue of the intra-union transfers 
associated with the Kemp-Wan tariff, an issue which is elegantly illustrated 
for a special case in Donald Davis's discussion of this paper. 
2. Alternative Approaches to Common External Tariffs 
Jacob Viner (1950), in his justly celebrated analysis of Customs Unions 
(CU), distinguished between trade-creating and trade-diverting unions and 
implied that the former enhance, and the latter lessen, global welfare. 
Although such a welfare implication was shown not to hold in general, the idea 
that the formation of a customs union should be judged in terms of its impact 
I 
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on global welfare is widely accepted. The GATT was negotiated and entered 
into in 1947 well before Viner's analysis (and long before that of Kemp and 
Wan) was published. It is therefore hard to say whether the negotiators of 
the GATT had, without using the Viner's terminology, the same concerns about 
trade diversion as Viner or indeed whether like Kemp and Wan they had global 
welfare in mind, in insisting that the common tariffs of a CU be no higher 
than the general incidence of tariffs of the member countries in the pre-union 
situation. Indeed, if they did, they (and as some, including economists still 
do) failed to appreciate that the height of barriers in a CU on its trade with 
non-members need not necessarily indicate how global welfare would be affected 
by the formation of the CU. 
Two of the proposals for reform of Article XXIV are by Bhagwati (1991) 
and McMillan (1993). Bhagwati proposed that a CU should be approved only when 
its common external tariff is set at the minimum of the pre-union import 
tariffs of the member countries. An implication of this is that the CU will 
engage in free trade with all non-members, if at least one member had a zero 
pre-union tariff for each of the traded commodities! Even if this were not 
the case, as I show in Section 3, the Bhagwati proposal could lower welfare of 
some members of the CU and raise that of non-members. 4 Since such a 
4The analysis of Syropoulos (1995a) of Nash equilibria of tariff games 
(in a symmetric three-country-three commodity world in which two countries 
form a CU while still maintaining some tariffs on internal trade) is of 
interest in this context. Internal liberalization (i.e. reduction of internal 
tariffs) could result in trade deflection and, as such, even if the CU sets 
its common tariffs a la Bhagwati's proposal so that there is external trade 
liberalization, nonetheless non-members could lose if the adverse trade 
deflection effect of internal trade liberalization outweighs the beneficial 
effects of external liberalization. Ju and Krishna (1996) analyze free trade 
areas without rules of origin. Since this is in effect equivalent to the 
adoption of the Bhagwati proposal, their analysis is also relevant. In a FTA 
formed by a developing country which (prior to the formation of the FTA) has 
higher tariffs on all imports (especially on final goods, they show that 
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possibility could deter the formation of a union, the Bhagwati proposal may 
still be treated as a desirable reform which in effect sets a price or hurdle 
on WTO members who wish to enter a customs union and thus compromise the MFN 
principle. 
McMillan (1993) also points out that Article XXIV of GATT 1947 
" ... nowhere is it specified how the 'general 
incidence' of a set of tariffs is to be measured. Are 
before and after tariffs to be compared item by item, 
or are average tariffs to be compared? If the latter, 
is it a simple average, or a weighted average with 
trade volumes as weights?" (p. 299) 
He suggests that 
"Article XXIV could be made more workable by phrasing 
its requirements not in terms of the height of tariffs 
but in terms of trade volumes; that is, by looking at 
the trade consequences of the restrictions rather 
than trying to measure their effect on domestic 
prices ...A proposed RIA [Regional Integration 
Agreement], in order to get GATT's imprimatur, would 
have to promise not to introduce policies that result 
in external trade volumes being lowered. And, if after 
some years the RIA is seen to have reduced its imports 
from the rest of the world, it would be required to 
adjust its trade restrictions so as to reverse their 
fall in imports." (p. 300) 
Measuring trade volumes is certainly more workable. But changes in aggregate 
volumes of trade with non-members need not necessarily indicate changes in 
global welfare. Besides, by substituting outcome variables (viz. trade 
welfare of FTA countries is likely to rise, and that of the rest of the world 
fall, if the FTA imposes no rules of origin. Bond et al. (1995) consider a 
three-country-multi-commodity endowment model with countries having identical 
preferences with a constant elasticity of substitution. Two of the countries 
form a CU while still maintaining some barriers on internal trade. They ask 
whether, in the context.of internal trade liberalization in the two countries 
forming a CU, adjustments in their common external tariff to keep unchanged 
the terms of trade faced by the outside countries (which they call Kemp-Wan 
adjustments) are incentive-compatible for member and non-member countries. 
They show that they are not, if the elasticity of substitution between member 
and non-member goods in consumer preferences exceeds unity. 
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volumes for instrument variables, viz. tariff rates), the McMillan proposal 
sanctifies the malodorous "managed-trade" approach to trade policy. 5 On the 
other hand the Kemp-Wan approach is based on tariffs that maintain the terms 
of trade of unchanged. -As such each non-member, as long as it maintains its 
trade barriers unchanged, will maintain its welfare at the same level as it 
was prior to the formation of the CU. Thus, global welfare has to increase, 
since at least one member can be made better off with the formation of the 
union without hurting others. Strictly speaking, the adoption of Kemp-Wan 
structure (which is in general not unique) keeps the prices faced by non­
members unchanged. 6 This in turn ensures that no one in any non-member 
country is adversely affected by the formation of the CU as long as each such 
country does not alter its tariffs. As such, adoption of a Kemp-Wan tariff 
structure by a CU is sufficient to ensure that the welfare of non-members is 
not adversely affected by its formation. It is certainly not necessary--after 
all, one cannot rule out the possibility that in spite of the change in the 
prices faced by non-members incidental to the adoption by a CU of a tariff 
structure that differs from a Kemp-Wan structure, welfare of non-members is 
not adversely affected. Also, as Winters (1996) rightly cautions, the Kemp­
Wan approach cannot be used as a benchmark to evaluate any proposed tariff 
51 thank Alan Winters for chiding me for not recognizing this feature of 
the McMillan proposal. 
6Kemp and Wan (1993) note that their proposed tariff structure is not 
necessarily unique. This can be seen by noting that a Kemp-Wan tariff on a 
commodity, being the difference between its domestic price in the CU and its 
unchanged world price, will in general depend on which of the many possible 
post-union Pareto Optimal allocations within the union is to be sustained as a 
competitive equilibrium through intra-union lump sum transfers. Of course if 
all consumers have identical homothetic tastes, within union lump sum 
transfers will not affect aggregate demand. In such a case we can treat the 
union as if it is populated by a single consumer, and provided its competitive 
equilibrium is unique, so will be its Kemp-Wan tariff structure. 
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structure. There is no way in general of determining how a deviation from a 
Kemp-Wan tariff structure by a CU affects welfare of consumers in any non­
member country relative to its level prior to the formation of the Union. 
3. Customs Unions in a Ricardian World: Two Examples 
I now turn to the characterization of Kemp-Wan tariffs. Let labour be 
the single factor of production with the labour endowment (inelastically 
supplied) of country i being Li (i=l,2,3). Let af be the unit labour 
requirement of commodity j in country i (i=l,2,3; j=l,2) so that the maximum 
possible output QJ of good j in country i is Li/aJ. Let the Samuelson social 
utility function be a Log C1 + (1-a) Log C2 (with O <a< 1) in all three 
countries. In autarky the domestic relative price of good 2 (with good 1 as 
numeraire) in country i is 1ri(A) = aJ/af. Let the ranking of comparative 
.advantage be 1r1 (A) < 1r2 (A) < 1r3 (A) . 
Suppose that, in the initial trading equilibrium, country 1 is 
specialized in and exports good 2 to the other two countries which are both 
specialized in good 1. Let the world relative price of good 2 with good 1 as 
numeraire be 1r(T). Let ti be the rate of ad valorem import tariff in country 
i so that the prices are as follows: 
Good 1 Good 2 
World Price 1 1r(T) 
Domestic Price: Country 1 l+t1 1r(T) 
Country 2 1 (l+t2 )1r(T) 
Country 3 1 (l+t3 )1r(T) 
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Let tariff revenues be returned to consumers in a lump sum fashion. Let 
Ei(T) be the total expenditure in co.untry i in domestic prices. Then country 
1 spends aE1(T) on imports of good 1 from the other two and country i (i=2,3) 
spends (1-a)Ei(T) on imports of good 2 from country 1. As such, the tariff 
revenue Ri(T) in country i is given by 
Expenditure Ei(T) =Value of Production+ Tariff Revenue. Hence 
for i 1,2 
Market clearance for good 2 (by Walras' law market for good 1 clears if the 
market for good 2 clears) implies that exports from country 1 equals the sum 
of imports of countries 2 and 3. Now 
lExports of good 2 from country 1 = aQJ
1+(1-a) t 1 
Imports of good 2 by country i 





For the assumed pattern of specialization and trade to be consistent, we 
must have '11'1 (A) < '11'(T) and '11'(T) (l+t 1 ) < '11' 1 (A) for i=2, 3. 
l+t 1 
Having characterized the initial trading equilibrium, the first example 
I consider is a CU of countries 2 and 3. I assume that the outside country, 
namely country 1, leaves its tariff unchanged at the same level as it was 
prior·to the formation of a CU by.the other two countries. The objective is 
to derive the Kemp-Wan post-union common tariff and characterize it as a 
function of pre-union tariffs. By definition, such a tariff will leave 
country l's welfare unchanged at its pre-union level while improving the 
welfare of at least one of the members without reducing that of the other. 
Since the tariff of country 1 is unchanged, for its welfare to be unchanged, 
its terms of trade after the formation of the CU should be the same as before. 
With its terms of trade and tariff remaining unchanged, the net exports of 
country 1, which in a balanced-trade equilibrium equals the net imports of the 
CU, also remains unchanged . .Given.the net.import.vector,.the CU countries can 
choose a production vector that ensures that at least one gains without the 
other losing or both gain as compared to the pre-union equilibrium. Thus the 
essential step in deriving the Kemp-Wan tariff is to look for a tariff that 
leaves post-union terms of trade at their pre-union level. 
Suppose the pattern of specialization and trade is unaffected by the 
formation of CU. Any common external tariff t to be consistent with the vague 
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provisions article XXIV of GATT 1947, presumably has to satisfy t ~ Max (t2 , 
t 3t 3 ) - (say). Let the new world relative price of good 2 be 1r(CU). It is 
easy now to see that, with a common external tariff t, and identical tastes in 
the two-member countries, imports of good 2 into the union will be 
(l-a)E(CU) where E(CU) is total expenditure of the union. Hence, tariff 
1r(CU) (l+t) 
t(l-a)E(CU)revenue will be By definition E(CU) • value of production+
(l+t) 
l+t -= ~ ·c?+ t(l-a)E(CU) so that E(CU)tariff revenue, or E(CU) 1 .........- .... ~ 
3 
Qt.
i=2 l+t (l+at) i=2 
Substituting this in the expression for imports of good 2, and equating it to 
aQi
the exports of good 2 from country 1, i.e. ----, we get 
l+(l-a)t 1 
Qi ,r(CU) = rl-a][l+(l-a)t 1 ] r~1 ~ Qt (2)[a"" [.L+at 1=2 
From (1) and (2), we get the critical relationship between the post-CU terms 
of trade 1r(CU) and the pre-CU terms of trade 1r(T): 
(3) 
t 2Now clearly the common tariff twill not be set below Min (t2 ,t3 ) = 
so that (l+at2 ) ~ (l+at3). If the weighted harmonic mean of (l+ati) with 
weights cit , i.e. [ cit ] is greater than (resp. equal to or less l+ati ' 
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than) (l+at), then w(CU) will be greater than (resp. equal to or less than) 
w(T). 
t 3Compare, more intuitively, the import-weighted average t of t 2 , in 




In fact, since there is no domestic production of good 2 in either country, t 
is also a domestic consumption weighted average of t 1 and t 2 • Put 
differently, the tariffs ti are simply consumption taxes. It is appropriate 
then that consumption weights are used to average them. 
> > 
Comparison of (3) and (5) shows that w(CU) = w(T) according as t = t. 
< < 
Of course, if w(CU) > ~(T) the country 1 outside the union gains from the 
formation of the union since its terms of trade ~(CU) are better compared to 
the pre-union situation and its tariff t 1 is unchanged. 
Now, I am in a position to analyse the implications, for the welfare of 
nonmembers, of the common external tariffs proposed by Bhagwati and Kemp and 
Wan. 
(1) The Kemp-Wan tariff, of course, has no impact on the nonmember 
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country's (i.e. country 1) welfare by assumption. For this to happen w(CU) 
has to equal w(T). -The.common .tariff that brings this about is clearly t 
which is unique in this example; the reason being that all consumers within 
the union have identical homothetic tastes so that lump-sum income transfers 
within the union have no effect on aggregate demand in the union and, for the 
·assumed tastes, competitive equilibrium is unique. Being a positive weighted 
average of t 2 and t 3 , t lies between the two. 
(2) The Bhagwati-tariff, which would be at t 2 (the lower of the two 
member tariffs in the pre-CU situation), will lead on the other hand to 
welfare gain for the country outside the CU. If there are no internal 
transfers within the union, country 2 will lose since·the terms of trade 
worsen and its tariff post union is the same as the tariff pre-union. Country 
3 experiences two effects relative to its pre-union situation--a terms of 
trade loss but a lowering of import tariff. This means that if there are no 
transfers, it may gain or lose. Thus, without transfers, the union will not 
come about since country 2 will lose from the union. 
(3) It was noted earlier that Article XXIV of GATT 1947 was vague in 
specifying how the general incidence of tariffs on trade with non-members in 
.the .pre~cu situation is .to be assessed. The Uruguay Round version does 
require that it should be based on an import weighted average of applied 
tariffs. In the present model, tis the weighted average of the applied 
tariffs t 2 and t 3 before the CU, using the imports (or equivalently 
consumption, since there is no production of the imported good) as weights. 
It was shown that as long as the post union common external tariff does not 
exceed t, the welfare of the outside country does not go down. Thus in the 
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present model the test proposed in the Uruguay Round version of Article XX.IV 
applies.exactly. 
Consider now the issue of internal transfers within the CU. With a 
Kemp-Wan tariff in place, the terms-of-trade of the union is the same as that 
in the pre-union situation, viz. ~(T). Also, the trade-vector of the union is 
the unchanged trade-vector of the country outside the union. Thus, given that 
the aggregate production vector of the union is unchanged, it follows that the 
aggregate consumption vector of the union is unchanged as compared to the pre­
union situation. Hence, the feasible allocation of post-union aggregate 
consumption between the two members can be shown in an Edgeworth Box as in 
Figure 1. The length of the horizontal (resp. vertical) side of the box 
equals the aggregate consumption of good 2 (resp. good 1) in the pre-union 
situation. Given identical homothetic preferences, the Pareto optimal 
allocations of the aggregate consumption between the two countries lie on the 
diagonal 0203 with 01 representing the origin for measuring consumption of 
country i (i=2,3). The pre-union allocation is at point T, with the 
indifference curves U1 (T) (i=2,3) passing through that point. The slope of 
the tangent TT1 to U1 (T) at T represents the pre-union domestic price 
~(T)(l+t1 ) in country i (i=l,2). The terms of trade ~(T) is represented by 
the slope of TF. The Pareto optimal allocations that are not inferior to T 
for either country lie between A2 and A3 • Of course, along any point on the 
diagonal 0203 including the stretch A2A3 , the indifference curves of the 
countries not only are tangent to each other, but also have the same common 
slope, i.e. the slope of A2A4 or A3A5 • The difference between the slope of the 
terms of trade TF and that of A2A4 or A2A5 equals the Kemp-Wan tariff t times 
the terms of trade ~(CU) and this does not depend on the post-union allocation 
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of consumption. Since T lies to the left of A1 on U1 (T), i = 2,3, it follows 
that t 2 < t < t 3 • If. the post-union allocation is at A2 , the welfare of 
country i (i=2,3) remains at its pre-union situation while the other member of 
the union gains. If the post-union allocation is at some point A between A2 
and A3 both countries gain from the union. The consumption expenditure of 
country i is the value of its consumption bundle at the post-union tariff 
2A4inclusive price A, i.e. the slope of A (or A2A5). This is financed by its 
income at factor cost (i.e. the value of its production at the same price), 
the tariff revenue from its imports and any transfer it receives from the 
other country. 
The second example relates to a CU between countries 1 and 2 instead of 
between countries 2 and 3. This case is interesting to analyze since, in the 
pre-union situation, the two countries are specialized in, and importing, 
different commodities. This is a situation typical of many real world CU's in 
which the pre-union trade patterns of members often are very different with 
some members exporting commodities which others import. For concreteness, let 
the common external tariff of the CU be the Kemp-Wan tariff. By definition it 
keeps the trade vector of the non-member country 3 unchanged. Since country 3 
is assumed not to change its tariff t 3 , this means its pattern, volume and 
terms of trade have to remain unchanged. In particular it will continue to 
export (resp. import) good 1 (resp. good 2). Thus post-union world relative 
price of good 2 has to be ff(T), i.e. ff(CU) ff(T) and the union will export 
good 2 and import good 1. The interesting issue is its post-union pattern of 
production. Clearly country 1 will continue to produce good 2. What about 
country 2 and what would be the domestic relative price good 2 in terms of 
good 1 in the union? 
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Given a common post-union Kemp-Wan import tariff ton good 1, its 
domestic price in the union (in units of world numeraire) will be (l+t). The 
domestic price in the union of its export good 2 is its world price (in units 
of world numeraire) ,r(T). Since ,r(T)(l+t2 ) < ,r2 (A) (the autarky price), a 
fortiori ,r(T)/l+t < ,r2 (A) so that country 2 continues to be specialized in 
good 1 after its joining a customs union with country 1. Thus the post-union 
production pattern of the union is the same as its pre-union pattern: country 
1 specializes in and produces Q} units of good 2 and country 2 specializes in 
and produces Qf units of good 1. 
Let E(CU) be the aggregate expenditure of the union (in world numeraire 
units). Then its demand for its import good, i.e. good 1, is aE(CU)/(l+t), 
given identical Cobb-Douglas tastes in the union countries (with a as the 
share of expenditure on good 1) and (l+t) being the domestic price of good 1. 
The domestic supply of good 1 in the union is Qf so that imports are 
aE(CU)/(l+t) - Qf. Tariff revenue on these imports is t[ aE(U)/(l+t) - Qf ]. 
The value of domestic production (Qf, Q}) at domestic prices is 
(l+t)Qf + ,r(T)Qi. Hence by definition E(CU) = (l+t)Qf + ,r(T)Q] + t 
or 
E(CU) = ~] [Qf+,r(T)Q£] (6) 
This in turn implies imports of [l+(l~a) t 3JQf+,r(T)Q£] - Qf units of good 1. 
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Equating this with exports (l-a) qf units of good 1 from country 3, yields
l-at 3 
or 
t = 1 (7)
1-a 
Once again the Kemp-Wan tariff t turns out to be unique in this example for 
the same reason as mentioned earlier. Now 
= -at2 Qf + (1-a) tl i Qf/(l+ati) 
l+at 2 i=2 
Thus, 




Now since country 1 does not produce good 1, it imports it from the 
other two countries both of whom export it. Thus the pre-union consumption of 
good 1 in country 1 equals the sum of exports of good 1 by countries 2 and 3, 
3 Qi (1-a)Qfviz (1-a) ~ Country 2 produces only good 2 and exports
i=2 (l+at 1 ) . l+at 2 
units of it. Hence, it consumes a(l+t
2
) units of it. Now a tariff at the 
l+at2 
t 2 rate t 2 on imports of good 2 is equivalent to a tax on exports of good 1 
l+t 2 
or a subsidy on its domestic consumption. As such it is seen from (7) that 
the Kemp-Wan tariff (or equivalently tax on consumption) of good 1 in the 




(or (subsidy of --) on its consumption in country 2 and tax t 1 on its 
l+t 2 
consumption in country 1 in the pre-union situation. 
It should be noted that since the two countries forming the CU 
(countries 1 and 2) were taxing and importing two different commodities in the 
pre-union equilibrium, and in the post-union equilibrium the union imports 
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only one of the two (namely good 1), the union's tariff (i.e. the Kemp-Wan 
tariff) cannot be expressed as an average with pre-union import weights of 
pre-union tariffs on good 1. By contrast, in a CU of countries 2 and 3, since 
both countries did not produce and imported the same good (namely good 2) in 
the pre-union equilibrium and continue to do so after they form a union, the 
Kemp-Wan tariff could be equivalently expressed as consumption-weighted as 
well as an import-weighted average of pre-union tariffs on good 2. 
0102Figure 2 illustrates the algebra. As in Figure 1, with Qi 
representing the origin for measuring country i (i=l,2), is the locus of 
Pareto Optimal allocations of aggregate consumption between the two members. 
The pre-union allocation is at T. The slope TT1 of U1 (T) at Tis the pre­
union domestic relative price of good 2 ff(T)/l+t1 in country 1. Slope TT2 of 
U2 (T) at Tis the pre~union domestic price ff(T)(l+t2 ) in country 2. The terms 
of trade ff(T) is the slope of TF. The post-union Pareto optimal allocations 
not inferior to T for either country are between A1A2 . At any of these 
allocations the domestic relative price of good 2 (i.e. ff(T)/(l+t) is the 
slope of U1 (T) at A1 , i.e. the slope of A1A4 which is also the slope of U2 (T) 
at A2 , i.e. the slope of A2A5 • From the diagram it is obvious that t<t1 and 
l+t2 > 1/l+t since T lies to the left of Ai on Ui(T), i=l,2. If the post­
union allocation is at Ai (i=l,2), the welfare of country i remains as in the 
pre-union situation and that of the other country increases. At any point in 
between, such as A, both gain whatever be the chosen allocation between A1 and 
A2 , the net transfer received by country i is the difference between the cost 
of its consumption (valued at post-union domestic prices) and the sum of the 
value of its production at the same prices and the tariff revenue from its 
imports. The sum of the net transfers of the two countries equals zero by 
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definition. 
The message from the two exa.D1ples is that the common post CU Kemp-Wan 
tariff is the pre-union-consumption weighted average of the pre-union taxes 
(or subsidies) on the commodity imported in the post-union equilibrium. In 
the case where this commodity is imported and not produced in the pre-union 
equilibrium by both countries forming the union, the Kemp-Wan tariff is also 
the pre-union-import-weighted average of pre-union import tariffs. It is 
shown below that a version of the consumption-weighted average 
characterization of Kemp-Wan tariffs emerges when we generalize the Ricardian 
model. 
4. A General Production Model 
The Ricardian Model of production in Section 3 together with identical 
Cobb-Douglas social utility functions in the three countries enabled the 
explicit computation of pre- and post-union equilibria algebraically. Since 
the Ricardian production technology is very special, it is worth examining the 
robustness of the characterization of the Kemp-Wan tariff as the consumption­
weighted average of pre-union consumption taxes to changes in production 
technology. In this section a general production technology (possibly 
different in different countries) involving the production of n (n ~ 1) 
commodities in each country from an inelastically supplied factor endowment of 
that country is implicitly assumed. However, all countries are assumed to 
have the same Cobb-Douglas social utility function. 
Let Qi(T) and Qi(CU) denote the output vectors of the ith member of the 
union (i-1,2, ... I) in the pre- and post-union equilibria respectively. Let 
~(T) be the equilibrium world prices and M(T) the net imports of the union in 
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the pre-union equilibrium. Let ti be the vector of ad valorem tariffs in 
country i·in the pre-union equilibrium so that the domestic price 11'~(T) of 
good j in country i is 11'j(T)(l+tf). Clearly if commodity j is imported (resp. 
exported) by country i, a positive tf is to be viewed as an import tax (resp. 
export subsidy). ·· A negative tf (which cannot be less than minus one) is an 
import subsidy (resp. export tax) by the same token. Let tariff revenue be 
returned to consumers in a lump sum fashion. Given identical Cobb-Douglas 
tastes, aggregate demand in each country depends only on prices and aggregate 
expenditure Ei(T). Now Ei(T) is the sum of the value of production at 
domestic prices and tariff revenues. The net imports MJ(T) of commodity j in 
country i is by definition the difference between domestic consumption cf(T) 
and output QJ(T). With aj denoting the share of expenditure on commodity j in 
each country, 
(10) 
Hence tariff revenue Ri(T) is given by 
n 










Using (15), Mf(T) = ------ - QJ(T) so that aggregate imports of union 




where Qj(T) = i: Qj (T) . 
i=l 
With the formation of the union, let the Kemp-Wan common external tariff 
on commodity j be tj. Given identical Cobb-Douglas tastes and common domestic 
prices in all members of the union, domestic demand of the union depends only 
on the aggregate expenditure of E(CU) of the union as a whole. As earlier, 
aggregate expenditure is the sum of the value of production in the union at 
domestic prices and tariff revenues. With unchanged terms of trade ,r(T) and 
ajE(CU)
common tariffs tJ•, imports MJ· (CU) of the union will be -=~-~ - Q (CU)
1rj (T)(l+t) j 
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I i
where Qj(CU) is the sum ~ Qj(CU). Using the analogue of (12) now for the 
i=l 
CU, it is easy to show that 
E(CU) = (l+t)V(CU) (18) 
where V(CU) (19) 
and (20) 
Substituting for E(CU) in MJ(CU), Mj(CU) 
By definition of Kemp-Wan tariffs tj, net imports Mj(CU) of the union is the 
same as its pre-union imports Mj(T). Hence, 
- I









~ Vi(T) + ~ wk(T)8k
i=l k=l 
From (14) and (19) it is seen that 
(aJ/l+tJ) aJ(l+ti) = (aJ/l+t}).,. = a- (l+t) = and 
J J l+t. n
J l+t~ n J ~ ak~ (ak/1 +tk)





= 1 "} represent appropriately weighted and 
j=l J 
normalized tariff structures, respectively of the union and of country i in 
the pre-union situation. In fact it can be shown using (10) and (14) that "J 
and"} equal respectively the share of the value (at unchanged world prices) 
of consumption of commodity j in the total value of consumption in the union 
and country i (prior to the union). 
·Vi(T) wj (T)8JLet wi(T) = Thus wi(T) is the share of 
I n 
~ Vi(T) ~ wk(T)8k
i=l k=l 
country i in the value at unchanged world prices of the output of the union in 
the pre-union equilibrium and wj is the share of the change in value (at 
unchanged world prices) of output of commodity j in the change in the value of 
output of all commodities brought about by the formation of the union and the 
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induced change in domestic price structure in each of the countries. 
Substituting these in (14), 
V(T) _l: 
I 
wirj + av • wj 
.i=l (24)V(T)+av 
or (25) 
where r j rj is the weighted 
average of pre--union rj. Now V(T) + av = l: 
I 
Vi(CU) > 0. If a> 0, 1'. 
> 
= 1'. 
J < Ji=l 
> 
according as wj = rj. Thus, if after the formation of the union, the value of 
< 
output of the union at unchanged world prices is higher than in the pre-union 
equilibrium, then the. Kemp-Wan normalized tariff factor rj will exceed (resp. 
fall short of) the weighted average rj of the normalized tariff factors r j i on 
commodity j in the union countries prior to the formation of the union, if the 
share wj exceeds (resp. falls short of) the same weighted average -irj. In 
particular, if wj < 0, i.e. the value of output of commodity j is lower in the 
post-union situation, then rj < -1rj. 
< < 
If av < 0, then r j ; r J according as wj ; r j . In particular, if wj < 0, 
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then ,,J > ,,J . Of course av < 0 does not necessarily imply wj < 0. 
It is clear from (23) that in the case of a world of pure exchange 
economies in which by definition QJ(T) = QJ(CU), av will be zero and hence 
,,J = ,, j. Although one cannot compute Kemp-Wan ,, j from the pre-union data of ,,; 
and V1 (T) for general production economies, if there are reasons to suggest 
that changes in output following the formation of the union are unlikely to 
make I V(T)av+llV I large, as a first order of approximation ,, j = ,, j . 
An alternative, but equivalent, approach to characterizing ,,j is to note 
that under assumption of balanced trade V1 (T) 
consumption of good j in country i in the pre-union situation. Also with 
unchanged net imports of good j in the union compared to the sum of net 
imports of member countries in the pre-union situation, the change in value of 
w1output aj = change in value of consumption. Thus the weights is also the 
share of the value of consumption in country i to the sum of the value of 
consumption in the member countries (both valued at unchanged world prices) in 
the pre-union situation. Similarly, wJ is the share of the change in value of 
consumption of commodity j in the sum of the changes in the value of 
consumption of all commodities, again at unchanged world prices, between the 
post- and pre-union situation. One can therefore interpret (24) using 
'consumption' weights for averaging. Thus the Kemp-Wan normalized tariff 
factor "Jon commodity j will exceed, equal or fall short of the consumption 
weighted average rJ of the normalized tariff factors "} on the same 
commodities in the union countries in the pre-union situation according as wj 
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(the share of the change in value of consumption of commodity j in the sum of 
changes in the value of all commodities between the post- and pre-union 
equilibria) exceeds, equals or falls short of the same Tj• In other words, 
if the formation of the union does not lead to a significant change in the 
value of consumption of all commodities, the Kemp-Wan normalized tariff factor 
r j on each commodity j will equal the -Consumption weighted average Tj. While 
this is the exact analogue of the characterization of Kemp-Wan tariffs in the 
simple Ricardian model, in a more complex model the analogy holds only 
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